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HOSTILE COEXISTENCE THE CHINESE CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Thesis)

Hostile Coexistence
The Chinese Challenge to the United States

by

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8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

In 1949, for the first time in more than 100 years, all of China was effectively controlled by a centralized government. This communist government has always been hostile to the United States, and, as Chinese power has grown, the seriousness of the confrontation has increased. This thesis views the United States from the Chinese point of view in order to formulate methods for dealing with the threat to Chinese security posed by United States power.

A study of Chinese history reveals that China has good reason to hate and fear the United States. For more than 16 years China has been vilifying the United States in every way possible to make the Chinese people aware that the United States is their mortal enemy. The US has ringed China with military bases, and US sea and air forces, armed with nuclear weapons, present a serious military threat to China. In addition, the United States has used every means short of actual war, political, economic, and psychological, to attempt to bring down the Chinese communist government.

The Chinese aspire to great power status. Other long range objectives such as economic development, military power, the regaining of lost territories, and world communist leadership are subordinate to, but directly support, their basic xenophobic nationalism. The Chinese look at the world from a long-term viewpoint and are quite willing to suffer short-term reverses to achieve their ultimate goal.

This thesis then develops a strategy, hostile coexistence, as a means of confronting the United States. It is an indirect approach for dealing with superior US power by exploiting American vulnerabilities and weakening the United States by every possible means. Methods advocated are people's war, penetration of the developing areas, formation of an anti-US united front, alienation of the US from its allies, direct subversion, and nuclear blackmail.

The thesis concludes by comparing hostile coexistence with actual Chinese behavior. Chinese policies of strategic boldness and tactical caution are ones which might reasonably be expected of an aggressive, nationalistic country when faced with an adversary of superior strength. The challenge presented by the Chinese is serious, and, unless it is accepted and countered by the United States, confident Chinese predictions of ultimate victory could very well come true.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In this study I view the United States as it might be seen by a Chinese leader in the Imperial City in Peking.¹ My purpose is to formulate objectives and policies for dealing with the threat to Chinese security posed by the United States. My sources have been primarily Chinese actions and statements.

Some say that this is an impossible undertaking, that no American could possibly think like a Chinese, especially like a Chinese Communist leader the nature of whose ascendancy to power has been completely unique, and who probably has very limited experience with the remainder of the world. Besides, China is a nation that has baffled Western minds for centuries. What we consider logical and reasonable they might consider completely illogical and unreasonable. And no one except the top Chinese leadership really knows much about actual Chinese intentions or strength at the present time.

All of this is true, yet, with the Sino-American situation as it exists today, I feel that such an attempt must be made. We must at least try to understand how the Chinese look at us if we

¹Throughout this paper "China" refers to the People's Republic of China whose capital is Peking. This does not necessarily reflect approval or acceptance of this regime, but merely recognizes that it is the de facto government of China.

are to develop a successful strategy for dealing with the ever increasing threat they represent to the world.

How does one go about trying to decide how things look through Chinese eyes? It would certainly be a mistake to estimate Chinese intentions from official statements alone. Political leaders do not always mean what they say. Also, neither the invective of Peking's slogans nor the virulence of its attacks on the United States are completely reliable evidence of actual Chinese outlook. Their verbal bellicosity could just as well be an admission of weakness as a sign of strength.

Edgar Snow, the American journalist, who is one of the very few Americans to have even as much as a slight acquaintance with Mao Tse-tung, claims that the present Chinese leadership consists of rational men who are not blinded by ideology. Whether this is true or not, one can analyze those forces acting in the world today which would shape Chinese policy regardless of the type of government controlling the country or the personalities of individual Chinese leaders. And one can carefully study Chinese statements to try to determine what part, if any, is fact and what part is slogans, or ideology, or propaganda. And above all, one can study what the Chinese have actually done, and by extrapolation can hope to arrive at reasonable conclusions concerning what they are liable to do in the future in similar circumstances. Beyond this one can only speculate. This thesis is the sum of such analysis, study, and speculation.

No attempt is made to express this paper in the dogmatic fashion which is so typical of current Chinese writings. To them everything seems to be all black or all white. There are no shades of gray. Instead, the facts as they might be conceived by the Chinese are presented in what I consider an objective manner. The turgid prose, the stilted phraseology, and, above all, the repetitious Marxist dialectics are eliminated except, of course, in direct quotes of Chinese leaders which are used to establish basic lines of reasoning.

CHAPTER 2

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The conquerors, the white seafarers, have finally given up their colonies and withdrawn from Asia. The United States, however, still exerts a considerable amount of influence in the area. The United States backed our enemies in China's war of national liberation, was a bitter, hated opponent in the Korean War, still occupies the province of Taiwan, which is a part of Chinese national territory, and is presently actively fostering resurgent Japanese militarism as well as engaging in an aggressive war against our Vietnamese neighbors.

It is small wonder that the preamble to our Constitution specifies "resistance to American aggression" as a basic tenet,¹ or that not one favorable word about the United States has been officially spoken or printed in China for more than 16 years. US villainy was the overriding theme of the 1965 May Day celebration in Peking because the Chinese people are kept on a steady anti-US diet.² The new generation knows nothing else.

This state of affairs might be surprising to non-Chinese who remember cordial American relations with prior Chinese regimes. But if they were aware of what has really transpired in China they would have a more realistic view of the situation.

¹Constitution of the People's Republic of China, p. 4.

²Charles Lynch, Visit Report - China, p. 21.

We Chinese are proud of our recent accomplishments in starting China on the road back to its rightful place in the world. In 1949, for the first time in more than one hundred years, we achieved an efficient, centralized government. The foreign settlements with their extraterritorial rights and leased territories were evicted. Our age-old dream of eliminating all foreign imperialist influence from our banks, factories, mines, and communications and transportation enterprises was finally realized. And now we are the first non-Western power to achieve a nuclear detonation.

We have always had a great sense of history and tradition, and we are well aware of our legacy of twenty centuries of cultural primacy in Asia which developed the uniqueness of the Chinese people. Until modern times East Asia was effectively cut off from the rest of the world by vast oceans, high mountains, and barren deserts, but our influence spread to those areas around the rim of Asia that were geographically accessible. Our neighbors accepted our writing system, language, calendar, art forms and culture in general. To Korea, Japan, the Ryukyus and Southeast Asia, China was the only power, the "Middle Kingdom," the country to whom they all paid tribute.

But during the past century our country, though nominally independent, was in reality a colony of the great powers. Our ports, our greatest industrial city, even our taxes were leased out to foreign concessionaires. There are those who say that the United States was our friend during those days of weakness and

decline, that the United States "Open Door" policy was based on altruism toward a weak country. This, of course, was not so.

US policy at that time was governed by economic interest and political expediency. The Americans merely wanted to guarantee that they would not be discriminated against in trade. They wanted to compete on an equal footing with the European powers that had carved out enclaves. The "Open Door" policy served American best interests with a minimum of effort on their part. Similarly, in 1915 when the Japanese presented their twenty-one demands to try to reduce China to a vassal state, and when Japan demanded special privileges in Manchuria and Shantung during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the United States acquiesced to the violation of the territorial integrity of China.

In 1949 when it became clear to the Americans that our people's revolution was a complete success, it appeared that they would try to establish good relations with us even though they had bitterly opposed our cause. The US Secretary of State announced that America's defense perimeter in Asia did not include Formosa and South Korea, thus implying that the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan would not be defended. This soon changed.

The Americans repudiated their announced policy and invaded Korea. We warned them that an advance across the 38th parallel could only be regarded as a threat to Chinese security, but they insisted on forcing us to drive them back. In addition, they protected Chiang Kai-shek, and encouraged him to send saboteurs

and spies to the mainland. Finally, they deprived us of our legitimate rights as the true government of China by supporting Taiwan as China in world affairs.

The policy of the United States towards China has obviously been one of implacable hostility. They seem to have been against us merely because we exist. The Chinese people would like to be friendly with the American people, but the American government has made good relations between our two countries impossible.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung long ago clearly recognized the threat posed by the United States. In 1947 he said:

. . . Crisis, like a volcano is daily menacing American imperialism. American imperialism is sitting right on this volcano. This situation forced American imperialist elements to establish a plan for enslaving the world; to plunge like wild beasts into Europe, Asia and other places and muster the reactionary forces of various countries--these dregs spat out by the people³

Unfortunately, Chairman Mao's words proved to be only too true and his elder son was killed as a volunteer fighting American aggression in Korea. He was a fighter pilot and was shot down by the Americans.⁴

Nearly a generation later Marshal Chen Yi in a speech at the Soviet Embassy in Peking reemphasized that peaceful coexistence with the United States is out of the question. He also pointed out that since US imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the

³Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," in Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 155.

⁴Edward Behr, Der Spiegel, Hamburg, 9 Dec. 1964 as quoted by US Central Intelligence Agency, Political and Military Information on Communist China, p. 86.

people of the whole world that it is our duty to extend all-out support to the world's people in their anti-US revolutionary struggle.⁵

We are making every effort to impress the Chinese people with the predatory conduct of the Americans. For example, there are 20,000 carved Buddhas in the famous Buddhist caves of Lung-men near Loyang, but when visitors tour these caves the greatest emphasis is placed on the 38 items stolen by the US imperialists. The wall of one of the caves has been deliberately left in a mutilated state to show where two sculptures were hacked away, and there are photographs to show these sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum in New York and the Nelson Gallery in Kansas City.⁶

And to emphasize American decadence we are exploiting to the utmost the rumor that some American intelligence agents on Taiwan were homosexuals. In an opera in Shanghai last year the enemy were CIA agents and they were represented by effeminate characters who obviously looked like homosexuals.⁷

It is necessary to enlighten the Chinese people, because evidently nothing can lead to a change in the essence of American objectives. US imperialism is, by its very nature, predatory and when American policy meets with obstacles that cannot be surmounted by peaceful means it resorts to war. The Chinese people are never

⁵"Chen Yi's Speech," Daily Report, Far East, No. 31, 16 Feb. 1965, p. bbb 17.

⁶Charles Lynch, op. cit., p. 88.

⁷John Morgan, "The Mind of China," New Statesman, 25 Dec. 1964, p. 986.

allowed to forget that their enemy, US imperialism, is threatening them day and night. They must take it seriously. In this way they will redouble their efforts to increase China's strength and our country will regain its rightful place in the world.

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED STATES THREAT TO CHINA

We proved in the Civil War that over the long run one can defeat a stronger enemy if one uses proper methods. Now we again find that we must contend with a powerful and dangerous enemy, so it would be wise to consider Chairman Mao's thoughts on dealing with such a situation. More than 25 years ago he wrote:

. . . We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick the most reactionary section to strike at first

As a first step in our preparation we must assess the enemy threat. Just how dangerous is he, and what type of threat does he pose?

THE MILITARY THREAT

"US imperialism is carrying out armed aggression and suppression everywhere."² The United States is the primary military threat to China in Asia. By allying itself to South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, the United States has

¹Mao Tse-tung, "Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese United Front," in Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 199.

²Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Daily Report, Far East, Supplement No. 171 (48), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 24.

ringed China with military bases. The enemy is on our very doorstep.³ We are indeed surrounded by hostile forces.

At the present time our navy and air force are vastly inferior to those of the United States. American naval and air power in the Western Pacific, equipped with nuclear weapons, could inflict serious damage on our strategic and industrial centers. Our defense against massive air attack is inadequate. We have, however, been able to improve our air defenses as evidenced by the fact that we are now capable of shooting down the hated U-2's which have been flying over our territory from Taiwan for years.⁴

The United States Seventh Fleet, a direct threat to China, is deployed off of our coast with 150 capital ships, 600 aircraft, and 60,000 men.⁵ Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines are its primary maintenance and supply bases. Nuclear armed submarines and B-52 bombers based on Guam are also deployed as a direct threat to China.

In addition to using their air power for nuclear strikes, the Americans have the capability of attacking us with chemical and biological weapons.⁶ Because of our large population and chronically inadequate food reserves, the latter is a particularly serious threat.

But we cannot be defeated by sea and air power alone. The People's Liberation Army, as it demonstrated in Korea, is a match for the

³Quemoy is about as far from the mainland city of Amoy as Staten Island is from New York City.

⁴Four U-2's shot down by the Chinese were recently displayed in Peking. New York Times, 22 Aug. 1965, p. 2.

⁵"Background Material on US Aggression," Daily Report, Far East, No. 232, 2 Dec. 1965, p. BBB 7.

⁶Kung Tso T'ung Hsun, No. 10, 20 Feb. 1961, as quoted by Ralph L. Powell, Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China, p. 19.

Americans on the ground. Since we have an abundance of military manpower we have fashioned it into a well-trained, highly motivated force for conducting conventional ground warfare. As we continuously warn the Americans, if they invade China they will be drowned in a sea of manpower. Their atomic weapons will not prevail because the ultimate weapon is man. We have the "moral atom bomb, the might of the courage, political consciousness, and the spirit of sacrifice of man."⁷

THE POLITICAL THREAT

For sixteen years successive United States administrations have engaged in persistent denunciations of China. No matter which political party has been in power, the policy toward us has been one of unbending hostility. The United States Government has used every means short of actual war to attempt to bring down our government.

The US strategy has been to withhold official recognition, and keep China in diplomatic isolation. They have tried to keep us from expanding our international contacts, and they have applied political and economic pressure, especially to the relatively weak and poor states of Asia, to prevent other countries from recognizing the People's Republic of China. In addition, they have deprived us of our lawful rights as the true government of China by maintaining the Chiang government on Taiwan in the United Nations. More seriously,

⁷Editorial, Peoples Daily, 19 Nov. 1965.

they have supported and sustained the Taiwan government for all these years as an existing and operating alternative to our government on the mainland.

Avowed US policy is to encourage development within China of forces that would disrupt and destroy our government.⁸ They openly encourage counterrevolutionaries and rightists of every possible description, and readily admit that their objective is a Chinese government that will not interfere with American interests.⁹ It is very clear that politically the United States poses a direct and serious threat to our existence as a nation.

THE ECONOMIC THREAT

The US economic threat to China is closely tied to the political threat. Basically they have tried to build an economic wall around China to isolate us and to cut our trade. They have imposed a complete embargo on trade and financial dealings with us.

Because of China's exploitation by the imperialists prior to 1949, our country was allowed to remain poor and undeveloped; consequently, one of our main objectives has been to promote rapid economic development. American economic warfare, plus the fact that we are not receiving outside aid from any source, has made it difficult for us to accumulate the necessary investment capital and foreign exchange for

⁸Dean Rusk, "The Toilsome Path to Peace," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1293, 6 Apr. 1964, p. 531.

⁹US Dept of State, Guideline for Policy Operations - Far East, Feb. 1963, p. 7.

this program. So we have been forced to trade with other nations, and the American attempt to establish an economic wall of containment around us has been a complete failure. They have succeeded only in isolating themselves from us, not in isolating us from the world.

By 1964 we had trade relations with 125 areas and countries and had signed trade agreements with 40 foreign governments. In 1964 we held 13 trade fairs, participated in four international fairs, invited five countries to hold trade fairs in China, and asked 50 trade delegations of foreign countries to visit China.¹⁰ Even some of the closest allies of the United States have been anxious to trade with us. Japanese traders have been very active in China, the Canadians have sold us wheat, France has recently concluded a trade fair in Canton, and Britain has become sort of an international banker for our government with virtually all Chinese international transactions being carried on in sterling.¹¹

But we must be cautious. Our world trade is growing rapidly. Recently we have bought trucks from the USSR, Sweden, and France, heavy equipment from Japan, and diesel locomotives from West Germany.¹² We must not come to depend on trade like this or it may be used as a weapon against us. As Chairman Mao wrote in 1949:

¹⁰Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Charts Concerning Chinese Communists on the Mainland.

¹¹Charles Lynch, Visit Report - China, p. 72.

¹²Washington Post, 8 Jun. 1965, p. A16. Knowledgeable sources say that there is no reason to doubt the validity of this Peking report.

. . . If we trade with them and receive loans from them, it will be solely for the benefit of their capitalists and their bankers so that they can relieve crises In order to realize true independence of our national economy we must never rely upon the imperialist nations.¹³

The United States has tried to use economic warfare against us but it has not been effective. We have been able to trade when it has suited our needs, but our long range objective must be to develop China without trade or aid from anyone.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT

We are subjected to a constant barrage of propaganda from Taiwan designed to cause disunity by undermining the prestige of the Communist Party and the People's Government. This counter-revolutionary effort is, of course, financed, planned, and directed behind the scenes by the United States.

Another American psychological campaign is directed at our neighbors in Asia. Its purpose is to instill in them a fear of China. To counter this, we must make neighboring countries realize that new China, if treated with proper respect, harbors absolutely no aggressive tendencies, and that the People's Liberation Army exists only to defend our homeland.

By far the most serious psychological attack is one which is directed primarily at our young people. The Americans realize that those of us who have experienced the corruption, chaos, and misery

¹³Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 417.

of previous regimes will not be impressed by their psychological campaign, so they are trying to subvert our youth. The basis of this insidious effort is that the Americans believe that time will have an eroding effect on our people's revolution. They are trying to promote such erosion by psychological means.

In December 1963, Roger Hilsman, who was an American Assistant Secretary of State, spoke of "a more sophisticated second echelon of Chinese leadership," and stated that evolutionary developments could "eventually profoundly erode the present simple view with which the present leadership regards the world."¹⁴ This is merely a devious way of saying that the Americans are trying to subvert our people's regime. This is a very serious threat, and one which we must use every means at our disposal to counteract. The younger generation does not realize how hard we fought, and how much we suffered to achieve what we have today. We cannot let greed, easy living, and materialism corrupt our youth. The young intellectuals and students of China must never become alienated from the broad masses of workers and peasants. If they do, the Americans will achieve victory. Future Chinese leadership will nullify the revolution and make peace with the imperialists.

¹⁴Department of State Bulletin, Vol. L, No. 1280, 6 Jan. 1964, pp. 13-14.

CHAPTER 4

CHINESE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Now that we have appraised the threat posed by the United States, we must consider our broad long range national objectives before we can formulate specific methods for dealing with this threat. In other words, we must carefully consider what we are trying to do before we decide how to go about doing it.

One out of every five persons on earth is Chinese. For thousands of years China was far ahead of the rest of the world in economy and culture. The primary long range goal of our socialist revolution has always been to restore that situation, to return China to its rightful place as the most important and powerful nation in the world. This goal was clearly implied by President Liu Shao-ch'i in 1958 when he told the Eighth National Congress that "within a very short historical period we shall certainly leave every capitalist country in the world far behind us."¹ Our methods may vary depending on domestic and international conditions, but our ultimate objective remains unchanged. And we can afford to be patient. As Chairman Mao has said:

"... China will always be China. It is not soliciting anything. In one hundred years it will be even more difficult to ignore it. No, we are not in a hurry. Time

¹Liu Shao-ch'i, "Report to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," 5 May 1958, as quoted by US Dept of State, Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 83.

is our good ally. China must² above all devote itself to the building of socialism.

Our other national goals are subordinate to, but directly support, our primary objective. As we build socialism, we will accelerate our economic development, both industrial and agricultural. Fortunately China is a large country, and our resources are rich and varied. We have the will, and we have the wherewithal. The only other ingredient we need to transform our agricultural country into an industrial power is time.

To gain that time, we must keep our military forces sufficiently strong to preserve our own security. Our most important resource is manpower, which we must exploit in every way possible to deter the United States from attacking us.

Another basic goal is to regain the territories that have been illegally taken from China. These claims are not new. Even Sun Yat-sen decried China's loss of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Burma, Annam (which includes all of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), the Amur and Ussuri River basins, and the areas north of the Ili, Khokand, and Amur Rivers (now part of the USSR).³

Finally, we must strive to make Peking the focal point of the world communist movement. The Afro-Asian world is looking for leadership, so it is up to us to win the battle for men's minds,

²Mao Tse-tung, "Interview with French Senator Mitterand," 23 Feb. 1961, as quoted by US Dept of State, Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 81.

³Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 33-35 as quoted by Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict.

if China is to take her proper place in the world. We must lead a world communist movement based on our concepts of Marxism-Leninism.

It is particularly important that we keep these long range goals continuously in mind in order to ensure that our **tactics** are always designed to contribute to the desired objectives. Because of the nature of its political system, the United States must concentrate on clear-cut, easily recognizable, short run victories. Based on our experience in the Korean War, the Americans have a strong tendency to lose their interest and enthusiasm; hence, they will force their leaders to abandon long, disagreeable, low-grade confrontations. If we are willing to accept hardship and suffer tactical reverses, we will eventually achieve our **ultimate** objectives.

CHAPTER 5

HOW TO CONTEND WITH THE UNITED STATES

GENERAL

In 1945 who would have given us the slightest chance to defeat Chiang Kai-shek? At that time Western strategists assumed we had inappreciable power because we controlled no cities of consequence, were poorly armed, had few material resources, little money, and no allies. Even the USSR recognized Chiang's government as the legal government of China. The Nationalist armies were trained, equipped, and backed by the United States which was then undisputedly the world's strongest military power. Yet in four years, without benefit of outside aid, our outnumbered, supposedly inferior, forces completely routed Chiang's armies.

Now twenty years later Western strategists again assume that we have inappreciable power because we do not possess the material resources of the United States. Again we can prove them wrong if we pursue the proper tactics. This time it may take 40 years or even 400 years, but correct policies will enable us to prevail. As Chairman Mao has said, "From a long term point of view it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful."¹

¹Mao Tse-tung, "Talk With the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 100.

It is quite apparent that our basic national objectives will cause us to have repeated tests of strength and will with the United States, because that country is the major obstacle to the attainment of our goals. But we are presently unable to project our military strength directly against the United States, and our capacity for applying economic pressure is negligible. In fact, trade between our countries is vital to neither of us. Similarly, we have been unable to bring any direct political pressure to bear. In other words, we cannot strike directly at American power. How then can we hope to achieve our objectives?

Minister of Defense Lin Piao recently indicated the nature of the tactics we must adopt when he said to the Americans:

You rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly conscious revolutionary people; you give full play to your superiority and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fighting and we have ours.²

Obviously we are forced to use the indirect approach. Militarily we must conquer from within by the use of subversive insurgency or people's war. And we reinforce this with political, economic, psychological and cultural subversion. We must be careful, however, not to overplay our hand. After all, there are limits to the extent that clever maneuvering, political skill, or even grim determination can overcome an adverse power balance. But as time renders the balance of power more favorable, we can gradually step up our pressure.

²Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Daily Report, Far East, Supplement No. 171 (4S), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 16.

PEOPLE'S WAR

There are numerous places in the developing areas of the world today that have vulnerable regimes, and are susceptible to subversive insurgency. It is to our great advantage to keep the United States involved in peripheral engagements which it cannot win, yet feels that it cannot afford to lose. Any multiplication of armed conflict in distant places reduces our direct jeopardy because it causes the United States to disperse its strength; consequently, we must be willing to promote such conflicts by every means at our disposal.

This is a low intensity, protracted type of program. We must take care that we do not present enough of a threat at any given time to encourage the US to use all of its potential strength, including nuclear weapons. As long as we do this, the United States will find it extremely difficult to develop a successful political-military counterstrategy to people's war. As Marshal Lin Biao has clearly pointed out:

. . . the greatest fear of US imperialism is that people's wars will be launched in different parts of the world, and particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and why it regards people's war as a mortal danger.³

And the risk of US retaliation directly against us for supporting revolutionary warfare in another country is not really very high. As long as we can keep the situation reasonably ambiguous, the

³Ibid., p. 26.

Americans are too irresolute to deliberately start a war with us. They require great provocation.

From our viewpoint, another great advantage of people's war is that it does not require modern weapons or vast financial resources, which, of course, we do not have at this time. Our relative national weakness in those areas is not much of a handicap. The primary requirement is popular support. Since we so recently drove the imperialists from our own country, we have a good understanding of the needs of the people and the forces that motivate them. What we have to do is to encourage and assist the liberation of the masses by the masses themselves. Other than providing them with small arms, our primary effort is in training local leaders to organize their own people. Students, intellectuals, and leftists are our most fertile source for revolutionary leadership, but we must not overlook communal or even tribal leaders, because no outsiders can lead a people's war of national liberation. Only the people can gain freedom for themselves. Our objective is merely to create the proper conditions for the seizure of power by people friendly to us, and this can be accomplished most readily by promoting instability by exploiting the vulnerability of these developing societies to dissidence and violence. "More than 90 per cent of the people of the world want revolution. We stand firmly on their side."⁴

⁴"Welcoming 1966 - The First Year of China's Third Five-Year Plan," Renmin Ribao, as quoted by Peking Review, 1 Jan. 1966, p. 9.

PENETRATION OF ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA

Unfortunately one cannot turn on people's wars like one turns on a water faucet. In some developing areas, the people are either unable or unwilling to make a serious effort to liberate themselves. Here is where we must resort to subversive measures designed to undermine the US position. It is relatively easy to turn the strong nationalism and anti-white feelings of most colonial, anti-colonial, and newly independent countries against the United States. In addition, we can exploit the grievances of the oppressed classes and any political, economic, or social instability. But we must always remember that the exploitation of these negative emotions is a double-edged sword. To avoid any unfavorable reaction of the local population, we must be careful to keep our actual involvement as inconspicuous as possible.

In giving foreign aid the United States imposes on the recipient countries a number of conditions which are exacting and of an aggressive and oppressive nature.⁵ We should provide small amounts of economic assistance to selected countries, primarily to discredit US aid and motives. Depending on the circumstances in the country, our aid should be outright grants, provision of raw materials, or long-term credit at little or no interest. There should be no strings attached. At the same time, we should clearly point out that the object of US aid is not to help the people but to keep

⁵"For the Economic Emancipation of Afro-Asian Peoples," Peking Review, No. 10, 5 Mar. 1965, p. 20.

reactionary regimes in power. US aid is merely a tool of neo-colonialism, a means of penetrating and controlling weak countries. Food is a particularly sensitive subject. We should make it clear that the United States uses food for political purposes, that food has become one of the most important weapons available to the United States for gaining economic and political control and influencing the policies of poor countries.

To further discourage Asian, African, and Latin American countries from leaning toward the United States, we should stress the theme that the US is the source of their misery in the first place. As Bertrand Russell points out, the United States has only 6% of the world's population yet it owns or controls more than 60% of the world's natural resources. This can be emphasized as the basic reason for the starvation level of existence in much of the remainder of the world. The US has gotten rich at the expense of the people of the world. And that is why the United States needs such a mighty war machine--to protect its system of plunder.⁶

As a final means of penetration, we must organize and indoctrinate a political leadership in these developing countries that will look to China as a model to follow. Our rise from weakness to strength in less than a generation is certainly worthy of emulation. As Vice Premier Chen Yi recently noted:

The people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America will overtake the industrially advanced countries within a few decades, once they shake off the control of

⁶Bertrand Russell, Peking Review, No. 50, 10 Dec. 1965, p. 10.

imperialism and old and new colonialism and start to build their countries by relying on their own efforts. The history of New China over the past 16 years provides most vivid evidence.⁷

The stronger China becomes the more desirable our system will appear to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the future of the world may very well depend on the political orientation of this vast intermediate zone. Fortunately, "there are already signs of an approaching new and great anti-US revolutionary storm in Asia and Africa and the whole world."⁸

FORMATION OF AN ANTI-US UNITED FRONT

Premier Chou En-lai recently emphasized that "an international united front against US imperialist policies of aggression and war is growing and expanding throughout the world."⁹ As a logical follow-on step to our penetration of individual countries of the developing world, our goal should be to establish and head just such a world-wide anti-US front. It should be a loose alliance of the primarily non-white nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and it should have an avowed purpose of driving US influence from those three continents, especially from Asia. According to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, "If there were some 15 countries in the world that followed the line of noncooperation toward US imperialism,

⁷Chen Yi, "Press Conference," Daily Report, Far East, No. 197 (6S), 12 Oct. 1965, p. 3.

⁸Chen Yi, "A New and Great Anti-US Revolutionary Storm is Approaching," Peking Review, No. 2, 7 Jan. 1966, pp. 5-6.

⁹Chou En-lai, "Speech at Reception Given by Albanian Ambassador," Peking Review, No. 49, 3 Dec. 1965, p. 5.

refused to provide it with military bases, and forbade its aircraft and ships to use their airfields and ports, this would be enough to force United States imperialism to retreat."¹⁰ In this manner, the United States, which is too strong to be dislodged by force, can be driven from the continent of Asia.

Then, to show that we understand American history and foreign policy, and that we would like to apply the lessons learned therefrom, we should proclaim our own version of a "Monroe Doctrine" for Asia. Simply stated, this would mean no Western colonies in Asia, and no interference by non-Asian powers in the internal affairs of Asian states.

SEPARATING THE UNITED STATES FROM ITS ALLIES

In our campaign against the United States, we must also be alert to any opportunity to split the US from its allies and disrupt Western unity. For the industrialized countries, trade can be used as a powerful lure. Since selective trade can serve to strengthen our economy, we can afford to promote commercial relations with Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, West Germany, and any other US ally who will deal with us. Business interests in these capitalist countries exert a considerable amount of political influence, and, when profit is involved, these interests resent American pressure against trade with China.

¹⁰"Must Take Risks in Anti-US Fight," Daily Report, Far East, No. 200, 15 Oct. 1965, p. BBB 1.

We have made excellent progress recently with the French, who have sent many diplomats, traders, and cultural emissaries to China. The French were extremely active at our trade fair in Canton in the Spring of 1965,¹¹ and their government sponsored an industrial exhibition in Peking which commenced on 22 November 1965. At the opening of that exhibition, Nan Han-chen, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, wisely kept politics foremost when he remarked that US imperialism is unwilling to see us develop friendly relations with countries like France, and is trying unsuccessfully to blockade and embargo China.¹²

Japan is the strongest ally of the United States in Asia. We must spare no effort to break up this alliance. Here again we can use trade as a political tool, but we can also exploit resurgent Japanese nationalism by such means as condemning the Japan-US Security Treaty as ill-disguised colonialism, and denouncing US military bases as infringing on Japanese sovereignty and threatening her independence and peace. It would be to our great advantage to create some crisis in US-Japanese relations shortly before 1970, which is when the Security Treaty will be up for renewal.

Various types of exchange programs can be used to promote an anti-US theme. For example, when 140 Japanese youth recently came

¹¹Charles Lynch, Visit Report - China, April - June 1965, p. 71.

¹²"French Industrial Exhibition Opens in Peking," Daily Report, Far East, No. 227, 24 Nov. 1965, p. bbb 23.

to China for the China-Japan Youth Friendship Festival, workers from one of our machine tool plants presented the Japanese visitors with a banner which read, "Chinese and Japanese youth unite and oppose the common enemy, US imperialism."¹³ This type of cultural exchange is so important that Chairman Mao, himself, received our Japanese friends.

The Japanese are particularly sensitive to anything concerning nuclear weapons; therefore, we can use visits of nuclear submarines to Japan to stir up anti-US sentiment. The charge that the United States is trying to turn Japan into a nuclear base is sure to incite an angry wave of protests by Japanese leftist elements.

France and Japan have merely been used as examples to illustrate the methods we must use to split the United States from its allies. Every country is different, and each has its vulnerabilities. We must continuously strive for just the right balance of diplomacy, psychology, and pressure to achieve our ends.

DIRECT SUBVERSION

As noted previously, we are unable to exert direct pressure on the United States, but we can attempt to manipulate public feelings in that country. We can also encourage causes which, knowingly or not, promote our interests. There are some leftist groups, but there are many others that are merely liberal or just hostile to war

¹³"China-Japan Youth Friendship Festival Ends," Peking Review, #51, 17 Dec. 1965, p. 4.

in general. Our objective is to convince such people that the United States has no business being in Asia, particularly on the mainland. There have been grave doubts for many years, even in official circles, about the wisdom of US foreign policy in Asia. More than ten years ago a member of the United States Congress made the following very interesting statement:

We have to make up our minds, it seems to me, at some point whether the United States, way over here 6000 miles away, can remain a dominant factor on the western rim of the Pacific Lake. I think that it is a very important question because we have become so deeply involved in this thing that we ought to measure the possibilities and probabilities before we get in too far.¹⁴

This is the type of thinking that we must encourage.

Although we must maintain the utmost hostility toward the American government, lest US leaders be encouraged to be more aggressive towards us, we should always claim friendship with the American people. Those groups that are particularly susceptible to being influenced are workers, students, revolutionary intellectuals, and certain minority groups, particularly the negroes. As Chairman Mao recently noted, "The speedy development of the struggle of the American Negroes is a manifestation of the sharpening of class struggle and national struggle within the United States;

¹⁴US Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Testimony by the State Department Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs in Support of the 1955 Budget, 26 Jan. 1954, p. 126.

it has been causing increasing anxiety to US ruling circles."¹⁵

In the United States, real or **imagined** grievances are not as acute as in the developing countries, but they do exist and can be similarly exploited. Our avowed goal is to establish ties between the American people and the revolutionary people of the world.¹⁶

To help in establishing these ties, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders have always made a point of meeting and entertaining distinguished American guests. As recently as 24 November 1965, Chairman Mao and his wife Chiang Ching received the noted writer Anna Louise Strong and several other American friends, and later gave a banquet in honor of Miss Strong's 80th birthday.¹⁷

Our program is carried on in conjunction with a much broader campaign to mobilize and manipulate world opinion against the United States. The subversion of the American people is an important part of establishing our international anti-US front. As Chou En-lai noted in his speech at the Albanian Embassy previously quoted, "A people's movement on an unprecedented scale **against** wars of aggression and against oppression and exploitation is developing vigorously in the United States."¹⁸ We must use every means at our disposal to

¹⁵"Statement Calling on the People of the World to Unite to Oppose Racial Discrimination by US Imperialism and Support the American Negroes in Their Struggle Against Racial Discrimination," Statements by Mao Tse-tung, p. 4.

¹⁶"Anti-War Movement Analyzed," Daily Report, Far East, No. 229, 29 Nov. 1965, p. BBB 7.

¹⁷"Mao Tse-tung Receives American Friends," Daily Report, Far East, No. 228, 26 Nov. 1965, p. BBB 8.

¹⁸Chou En-lai, op. cit., p. 5.

promote and extend this people's movement. In the United States, as everywhere else, our ultimate target is the people.

THE NUCLEAR GAME

The atom bomb is a paper tiger with which the American reactionaries try to terrify the people. It looks terrible, but in fact is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass annihilation; the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons.¹⁹

The first sentence of the foregoing statement of Chairman Mao Tse-tung is often quoted by Western analysts in an attempt to show that we Chinese do not understand the implications of nuclear weapons and are, therefore, indifferent to them. This, of course, is nonsense. We certainly wouldn't have diverted such a large portion of our scientific and economic resources to nuclear weapons development if we considered them unimportant. What is important is that weapons of mass annihilation are unlikely to be used in people's wars of national liberation, and that basically wars are won by the morale and resolution of the people, not by weapons alone. These are not new thoughts and are generally recognized by reasonable men.

But since we now possess nuclear weapons ourselves, we can use them as a political tool to achieve our ends. It is futile for us

¹⁹Mao Tse-tung, Interview with Anna Louise Strong, Aug. 1946, in "Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers," People's Daily, 31 Oct. 1958, as quoted by Chinese Communist World Outlook, p. 97.

in the foreseeable future to attempt to match the technically superior United States in numbers of nuclear weapons or delivery systems. Our problem is to gain maximum advantage from a relatively small number of weapons. To do this, the first step is to establish a credible threat.

We have already laid the groundwork in that we present an aggressive, militant attitude towards the United States. "We say that in order to oppose US imperialism it is imperative to wage a serious struggle and to take risks. Only in this way will we be able to win."²⁰ We also make it clear that we take the long view of history, and thus do not fear nuclear war. As Chairman Mao said in Moscow on 18 November 1957:

I debated the question with a foreign statesman. He believed that if an atomic war was fought, the whole of mankind would be annihilated. I said that if worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the world would become socialist.²¹

Militancy is not enough, however, and at present we cannot deter US military power by directly threatening the United States with land-based ballistic missiles. Until we develop such a threat, we must rely on other means.²² We do have submarines with a guided missile capability that could be adapted to fire nuclear warheads.²³

²⁰Chen Yi, "Must Take Risks in Anti-US Fight," Daily Report, Far East, No. 200, 15 Oct. 1965, p. BBB 1.

²¹Mao Tse-tung, People of the World Unite for the Complete Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons!, Foreign Languages Press (China), pp. 41-42.

²²A rough consensus of unclassified estimates gives China an MRBM capability by 1967, ICBM by 1975.

²³Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 52.

They could position themselves off the west coast of Mexico or Central America, and fire at major western United States coastal cities. If we could establish close relations with some coastal country in South America or Africa that we have penetrated, we could station submarine tenders along their coast; and if we had sufficient trade so that it became normal for our ships to go back and forth, we might even introduce guided missile ships disguised as merchant ships.

The point of all of this is not to establish a capability for a surprise attack on the United States, because they would certainly destroy China in retaliation. Our objective is merely to have the capability to annihilate a few US cities, and to have the Americans well aware of this fact. Then, in some future confrontation, the US president would be faced with the agonizing decision as to whether some distant problem, perhaps vital to China but not really vital to the United States, was worth a threat to millions of American lives. He would undoubtedly be under tremendous popular pressure to withdraw. Another advantage would be that our nuclear threat would certainly deter the Americans from using their nuclear weapons lightly in some local war.

Of course, our primary policy regarding nuclear weapons must be to press for complete nuclear disarmament, since this would relieve us of the greatest threat to the attainment of our goals, namely US nuclear power. The United States, however, is unlikely to consider such a proposal seriously unless we are able to apply some sort of pressure. How can we do this?

It is basic United States policy to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But there are many countries in the world today that have the capability of producing such weapons, and some of these countries are potentially antagonistic to the United States. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently stated:

China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs themselves, and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs.²⁴

Our policy should be that the development of nuclear weapons by peace-loving socialist states should not be oppressed as long as the United States is unwilling to reach agreement on the banning of nuclear weapons. We might even imply that we will aid countries particularly friendly to China in the development of such weapons. The specter of widespread nuclear proliferation could very well pressure the United States into serious discussion of general nuclear disarmament. After all, they have far more to lose in the nuclear game than we do.

²⁴Chen Yi, "29 September Press Conference," Daily Report, Far East, No. 197 (6S), 12 Oct. 1965, p. 4.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is a description of how to confront the United States while avoiding a direct clash with American power. It might be called a strategy of "hostile coexistence."

The primary objective of hostile coexistence is to weaken the United States by any possible means. The methods described are not new. Our leaders have been advocating most of them for years, but the Americans either do not listen or else do not take China seriously.

Hostile coexistence is not a quick and easy solution, it is a doctrine of protracted struggle. There will be ups and downs. We will undoubtedly be forced to disengage from situations which are rendered disadvantageous or untenable by US pressure, but if we assiduously pursue this program we will emerge victorious in the long run.

Above all we must always remember that hostile coexistence is not a strategy of confrontation with the United States merely for its own sake. It is the **best** means of attaining our ultimate goal, the restoration of China to its ancient glory.

CHAPTER 6

EPILOGUE

Thus concludes my plan for the Chinese to confront the United States, a strategy of hostile coexistence. I seriously considered an opposite strategy of tranquil coexistence, or how to lull the United States into a false sense of security, but discarded it when I finally became convinced that China's primary motivation today is nationalism, not communism. A football coach who has discovered a system which has produced unprecedented success for his team is justifiably proud of that system; however, his primary interest is still in the success of that team not in the system itself. So, regardless of what they say, I believe that the Chinese are using communism as a tool to promote China, not China as a tool to promote communism. In other words, they will always subordinate support for communist revolution to their direct security needs or national interests. And Chinese national interests would be essentially the same no matter what type of government controlled a unified China. Of course, in using communism as a tool, the Chinese must encourage and promote the system.

I am convinced that the Chinese aspire to great power status. It is wishful thinking for the United States to expect such a China to placidly accept non-communist pro-US governments on the mainland of Asia any more than the US government would accept communist pro-Chinese governments in the Americas. And the Chinese do not accept American superiority as an everlasting fact of life.

When the Chinese say that US imperialism, the ferocious enemy of the common people of the world, must be destroyed, they really mean it, but not because they are communists and we are capitalists. The Chinese are always very careful to say that their goal is to destroy US imperialism, not to destroy the US itself. This is a reasonable objective, because US imperialism directly conflicts with Chinese imperialism. Imperialism is "the policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking to extend the control, domination, or empire of a nation."¹ The United States and China are both imperialistic. All major powers seem to be.

I feel that the Chinese really believe what they say about the inevitability of revolution and of the decline of the United States. A new pattern of subversive insurgency has emerged to replace conventional war, and the developing areas are rich in situations that are likely to lead to revolutions. The Chinese have always been skillful at politics, and they are perfectly willing to fish in these troubled waters for political gain.

So as I compare my strategic model with actual Chinese behavior, I find that they are doing pretty much what I would be doing if I were in their shoes. This is in the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy, I suppose, because my thinking has undoubtedly been colored by what the Chinese have said and done. For years in their speeches,

¹Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 416.

programs, and other official publications, they have been remarkably candid about what they are trying to do, and in general their actions have matched their words. They have not been uniformly successful, but they seem to be reasonably consistent in the pursuit of their goals. Their policies of strategic boldness and tactical caution are ones that might reasonably be expected of an aggressive, nationalistic country, when faced with a status quo power of superior strength.

Using a strategy of hostile coexistence, it is quite evident that the Chinese, even from a position of relative weakness, present a serious challenge to the United States. Unless we accept and counter that challenge, their confident predictions may come true.

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